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Imagination and the motivational view of belief
Lucy O’Brien
1. The view that beliefs can be characterized solely by their motivational
role promises an informative reduction of what it is for a state to be a
belief state. It is therefore of import if such a view is wrong. In ‘On the
aim of belief’ David Velleman (2000) presents an argument against such
a motivational view of belief.1 On Velleman’s construal of the motiva-
tional view:
All that’s necessary for an attitude to qualify as a belief is that it
disposes the subject to behave in ways that would promote the
satisfaction of his desires if its content were true. An attitude’s ten-
dency to cause behavioural output is thus conceived as sufficient to
make it a belief. (2000: 255)
It is clear that this needs a little clarification. A subject’s perceptions that
p, or desires that p, or questions as to whether p, may be such as to dispose
him to form beliefs that p, which in their turn will dispose him to behave
in ways that bring about the satisfaction of his desires, if p is true. Those
attitudes, therefore, dispose our subject to behave in ways that would
1 His paper is a rich and fascinating one that also does much else. However, it is this
aspect of the paper that is to be considered here.
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promote the satisfaction of the subject’s desires if the contents were true.
However, this is not sufficient to make them beliefs. It seems that the claim
of the motivational view must rather be that all that’s necessary for an
attitude to qualify as a belief is that the attitude, by itself and relative to
a fixed background of desires, disposes the subject to behave in ways that
would promote the satisfaction of his desires if its content were true.2
Velleman argues that the motivational view of belief cannot be right on
the grounds that attitudes, other than beliefs, can have the same motivat-
ing roles as beliefs. His overall argument involves two strands. First, he
argues in favour of the following two theses:
(1) States other than belief states can be identified as states where
something is regarded as true. When we assume or suppose that
p, we regard p as true. When we imagine or fancy that p, we
regard p as true.
(2) To regard p as true is to represent things in a way that disposes
one to behave as if p were true.
It follows from these two theses that:
(3) States other than belief can dispose one to behave as if p were
true.
Given the claim that:
(4) A belief that p disposes one to behave as if p were true
it seems to follow that:
(5) Beliefs and other states can share the same motivational role.
If (5) is true we clearly cannot characterize belief solely in terms of its
motivational role.
The second strand of Velleman’s argument is to argue directly for (5)
on the basis of examples which, he claims, show that states other than
beliefs can have the same motivational role as beliefs. Velleman’s central
example is drawn from looking at the motivational role of imagination in
make-believe or pretence.
I will argue here that Velleman’s central example does not serve to make
convincing the claim that imaginings in make-believe have the same moti-
vational role as beliefs. If I am right about this, we are then taken back
to the general argument presented above. If we cannot produce a convinc-
2 If the motivational theorist were to claim that he is operating with a notion of
‘attitude’ that rules out perceptions, desires, questions, or were to deny that percep-
tions, desires, questions can be said to have content that is true in the relevant sense,
then we would no longer have a purely motivational view. The claim could no longer
be that beliefs can be characterized solely in terms of their motivational role.
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ing example of an imagining and a belief sharing the same motivational
roles, what are we to make of the seeming plausibility of the argument
that suggests that there must be such examples? I want to suggest that the
notion of ‘disposing the subject to behave as if p were true’ does not serve
to pick a unique motivational role in the sense required by the motiva-
tional view. This results in the argument not going through. In particular,
the move from (4) to (5) will be illegitimate.
2. I want now to consider the cases that, Velleman claims, show that
imaginings and beliefs can be on a par in their motivating roles. It seems
to me that, in fact, the motivational role of imaginations will have to
piggy-back on the motivational role of beliefs, because the power of beliefs
to aid in bringing about bodily action depends upon their operating
against a background of an embodied subject who knows as a standing
condition which body to move, and how, when she tries to act.
Let us consider Velleman’s central example. Velleman asks us to con-
sider the example of child’s play, in which imagining disposes the child to
pretend. In particular he considers the case of a child pretending that he
is an elephant. Velleman argues that such cases of pretence are cases in
which imagining being an elephant disposes the child to behave as if he
were an elephant:
The child’s method is to imagine being an elephant – weighing a ton,
walking on stumpy legs carrying floppy ears – and then to wait and
see how he is disposed to behave. (2000: 257)
Velleman argues very convincingly, and importantly, that in pretending to
be an elephant, the child does not intend to simulate elephant appearances:
to act in ways which will fool others in to thinking that he is really an
elephant. Rather what he does is imagine being an elephant, imagine
having big heavy elephant feet and so on. He then acts on the basis of
such imaginings. I agree with Velleman that trying to create elephant
appearances is not what a pretending subject does. I also agree that the
child acts on the basis of his imaginings. However, if the example is going
to do the work required of it, it needs to be shown not just that the child’s
imaginings can motivate action, but that they can motivate action in just
the way that beliefs do in the normal case. Velleman claims that this is
just what we have to claim if we are to provide an account on which the
child is taken as properly engaged in the actions that constitute his pre-
tence, and avoid an account that takes the child’s play as depressingly
calculating and disengaged.
The first thing to note is that, in pretending, the child seems to be
motivated not just by imagining being an elephant. A child can perfectly
well be day-dreaming, imagining being an elephant wandering through
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the plains of Africa, without thereby pretending that he is an elephant. In
pretending the subject is also motivated to act out his imaginings. It is
plausible to claim that the child’s pretending is motivated by a desire to
act out his imaginings. That desire might be motivated by a number of
other desires: his desire to be an elephant, his desire to play the elephant
game with his friends, or perhaps by the desire that he keeps track of, and
so aids, his imaginings. Claiming this motivation for the child’s behaviour
does require that he in some sense operates with an awareness of a
distinction between that which is real and that which is imagined. But, it
does not seem that acknowledging these elements of a child’s unders-
tanding and motivation gives us a picture of the child’s activity that is
depressing or makes it seem disengaged. Whilst the child operates with a
real-world desire, the desire leads to behaviour which is imagination led:
it is a desire to be governed by the contents of his imaginings rather than
his beliefs. Velleman may not disagree with any of this.
However, and here we prima facie diverge from Velleman, in order for
the child to be motivated to act and so satisfy his desire of acting out his
imaginings, it must be that he does more than imagine. Prior to accom-
plishing his aim of acting out his imaginations he needs to complete the
task of draping the contents of his imaginings over the real world that he
knowingly inhabits and knows how to act in. Consider the child imagining
(from a first person perspective) some elephant desiring to drink from a
pail of water and imagining (from a first person perspective) the same
elephant believing that hanging its trunk over a pail will enable it to drink.
Merely imagining these will do nothing to cause the child to hang his arm
over a chair. The child also needs, besides desiring to act out his imagin-
ings, to do something to connect the content of his imagining to the world
that he can act in and needs beliefs about that world. He needs things he
can act with, and on, to go proxy for those things that he would act with,
and on, were his imaginings real. Now, as he can only act with his own
body, and only on those objects in the space around him, he needs to
assign to his arm the value of being a trunk and to the chair the value of
being a pail. Also, he needs to believe that he has an arm, that there is a
chair in front of him, that the chair is within reach and so on.
If what I have said is right, then imaginings that p, in such cases as the
child pretending to be an elephant, cannot be said to play the same
motivational role as the belief that p. The attitude of imagining that p, by
itself and relative to a fixed background of desires, does not dispose the
subject to behave in ways that would promote the satisfaction of his
desires if its content were true. Further, it seems to be a quite general point
that any ‘regarding as true’ states which are not beliefs, will require this
kind of connection to the subject’s beliefs about his actual world if they
are to result in action. Thus, it seems a quite general point that such merely
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‘regarding as true’ states will play a different motivating role from belief
states.
Now, Velleman is likely to reply at this point that there is a misunder-
standing: that it was not such imaginings as imagining ‘being an elephant
who desires to drink from a pail of water’, that were claimed to be able
to motivate in just the way that beliefs are. It was rather the imaginings
which connect between the imagined world and the real one that were
candidates for attitudes with the same motivational role as beliefs. It was
imaginings such as my imagining of my (LOB’s) arm that it is my trunk
(as opposed to my imagining – from a first person perspective – having a
trunk), my imagining of me (LOB) that I am an elephant (as opposed to
my imagining being an elephant), and my imagining of that chair, that it
is a pail (as opposed to imagining being in front of a pail). It is these
imaginings conjoined only with desire that can dispose the subject to act
as beliefs do. However, if this is the position, a number of problems now
emerge.
First, it is claimed that regarding p as true, whether in belief or imagi-
nation, can play the same motivational role. However, it is now hard to
see what belief my imagining that I (LOB) am an elephant can be com-
pared to in order to test for sameness of motivational role. If I somehow
could come to believe – rather than have a delusion – that I (LOB) am an
elephant then, it would seem to have a very different motivational role to
the corresponding imaginings. I would probably be trying to find ways to
resign from my job, break it to my family, buy a new bed and so on. I
feel motivated to do none of these things when I imagine I am an elephant.
And the same seems to be true of the child.
Second, but connected to the first point, it seems problematic to take
the imaginings in the make-believe case as attitudes of regarding-as-true,
in the sense that beliefs are taken to be regardings-as-true. Velleman
assumes that a belief necessarily involves regarding a proposition as true.
But, do I regard as true the propositions that ‘my arm is my trunk’, that
‘I am an elephant’, or that ‘the chair is a pail’? I could only regard these
as true if I were prepared to regard it as true that something can be both
an arm and a trunk etc. But it seems problematic to claim that I can even
merely regard as true that something be both an arm and a trunk. It seems
more natural to take such imaginings as attitudes, which like some per-
ceptions, can be directed at objects – the attitude of regarding my arm as
a trunk, myself as an elephant etc. Imagining my arm to be a trunk is
more like seeing the cloud as a camel, the duck as a rabbit, than like
believing that my arm is a trunk. However, if this is the right thing to say,
then the imaginings that have the power to motivate cannot be regarded
as attitudes of regarding-as-true in the sense that beliefs are. If the imag-
inings that motivate in the child’s make-believe are not regarding-as-true
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states, then the example cannot serve to fortify Velleman’s claim that belief
and other regarding-as-true states can share motivational roles. In fact, if
it is right to say that such imaginings as ‘my arm is a trunk’ do not involve
the subject standing in relation to a proposition that he regards as true,
we are going to have trouble even making sense of the claim that it is an
attitude that ‘disposes the subject to behave in ways that would promote
the satisfaction of his desires if its content were true’. We are going to find
it hard to say anything about what would happen if its content were true,
given that its content cannot be true.
Third, suppose we accept that the child’s imaginings (that he is an
elephant etc.) are regarding-as true states with a propositional content
whose truth conditions we understand. We still have to acknowledge that
his imaginings play a motivational role only relative to the child’s beliefs
about himself and his world. Such imaginings will not lead to action by
themselves, relative to certain desires. They will lead to action only given
that the child believes that he has an arm, that there is a chair in front of
him, and so on. Given that the child’s imaginings are dependent in this
way for their motivating power on the child’s beliefs it is implausible to
suppose that they can have the same motivational roles.
3. Let me assume that in §2 we saw good reason to doubt that imaginings
and beliefs have the same motivational role. Rather than the motivational
role of imaginings and beliefs being on a par, the motivational role of
imaginings depends upon the motivating role of beliefs. What, then, are
we to make of the general argument presented above?
The discussion of Velleman’s case of child’s play has I hope brought out
the fact that rather different kinds of motivational role can be indicated
by the locution ‘being disposed to behave as if p were true’. One can,
roughly, be ‘disposed to behave as if p were true’ if one ‘is disposed to
behave, as one would, when one takes p to be actually true or, distinctly,
‘if one is disposed to behave merely as if p were true, when one does not
take p to be actually true’. What consequences does this have for Velle-
man’s more general argument? It now seems that the transition from (4)
to (5) is illegitimate. We can no longer move from a claim about disposi-
tions to behave as if p were true to a claim about motivational role. If we
were to try to tighten the notion of ‘behaving as if p were true’ so that it
picks out only one motivational role, then the argument barely gets off
the ground. If we read ‘being disposed to behave as if p were true’ as ‘is
disposed to behave, as one would, when one takes p to be actually true’
then (2) appears to be false. Imaginings and assumings will constitute a
counter-example. If we rather read ‘being disposed to behave as if p were
true’ as if one is disposed to behave merely as if p were true, when one
does not take p to be actually true’, then both (2) and (4) appear to be
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false. (2) will be false as long as belief counts as a state in which one
‘regards p as true’ and it will not be plausible to claim (4), that beliefs
dispose the subject to behave merely as if p were true.
Velleman’s discussion succeeds brilliantly in his main aim of showing
us that imaginations can indeed play a critical role in motivating us to
act. However, he does not, I think, show that they can play the same
motivating role as beliefs, and so does not undermine a motivational view
of belief.
Does this mean that we should accept the motivational view? I think
not. If anything, I think it turns out that Velleman’s error is not that he
is too critical of the motivational theorist. Rather he is not critical enough.
The argument above in fact counts against even a motivational thesis
of ‘regarding as true’ states. Given the distinction between motivational
roles we have made, if we continue to accept the motivational view of
‘regarding as true’, encapsulated in (2), we have to choose to accept either:
(2¢) To regard p as true is to represent things in a way that disposes
one to behave, as one would, when one takes p to be actually
true.
Or
(2≤) To regard p as true is to represent things in a way that disposes
one to behave merely as if p were true, when one does not take
p to be actually true.3
If we accept (2¢) we can no longer take imaginings, assumptions etc. to
be ‘regarding as true’ states. If we accept (2≤) we can no longer take belief
to be a case of ‘regarding as true’. If we retain the understanding of
regarding-as-true states that we started with, we are going to have to give
up the motivational view of them. However, the motivational theorist
about belief may still claim that beliefs are a class of regarding-as-true
states which can be characterized solely by their motivational role. To
regard p as true in a way that constitutes believing p, it might be said, is
just to represent things in a way that disposes one to behave as one would,
when one takes p to be actually true. Such a claim can, however, only be
sustained if all representational states that dispose a subject to behave as
they would when they to take p to be actually true, are in fact states where
the subject regards p as being actually true, viz. belief states. Can we rule
out the possibility of a representation with the same motivational role as
a belief but for which we cannot say that it constitutes a case of the subject
3 In fact, there is good reason to doubt that ‘to be disposed to behave as if p were
true’ will pick up any particular set of dispositions, and therefore any particular
motivational role.
62 george f. schumm
Analysis 65.1, January 2005, pp. 62–69. © George F. Schumm
regarding anything as true? Might there not be representations that pro-
mote the satisfaction of the subject’s desires just if their content is true
but which are more primitive than beliefs?
This is not the place to answer these questions. Nevertheless, it seems
that to regard something as true, no less than to believe it, is to adopt an
attitude which makes us responsive to norms of rationality. Being in a
representational state with the right motivational powers does not
obviously  imply  being  subject  in  the  same  way  to  the  relevant norms,
and so does not obviously imply being in a state of regarding as true. In
assessing the motivational theory of belief, we might do better to consider,
not whether the motivational theory fails to distinguish one kind of
regarding-as-true attitude from another, but rather whether it fails to rule
out the possibility of states which share the motivational role of beliefs,
but which cannot be considered even as attitudes in which the subject
regards something as true.4
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An alleged problem for possible worlds semantics
An alleged problem for possible worlds semantics
George F. Schumm
Yannis Stephanou (2000) has conjured up a seductive argument against
the basic modal principle
(S) [It is possible that p] iff [there is a possible world w such that,
at w, p],
when the existential quantifier is understood objectually. He thus joins a
number of critics who have claimed that there are cardinality problems
facing substantive accounts of possible worlds. Certainly, if (S) has to go,
